Specifically, the summary highlights significant issues related to the ministry’s vigilance with respect to equipment maintenance, Civilian Disturbance Unit policies, and pre-attack intelligence handling.
The broader intelligence gaps described in the report are highlighted by a warning that Capitol Police received from the Department of Homeland Security on December 21, 2020, but which it does not appear to have fully utilized.
That day, “the Department of Homeland Security notified the Department of a blog that made reference to tunnels on the US Capitol grounds used by members of Congress and search of the website identified four ‘blog threads / topics. containing comments of concern, ” the summary reads.
“The report identifies the website as https://thedonald.win and includes several pages of comments posted on the website,” he adds.
The report exposes, for the first time, a surprising degree of indifference on the part of Capitol Police officials to routine household chores, such as failing to maintain an accurate list of officers assigned to the job. ‘Civilian disturbance unit.
The summary notes that the “CDU” list counted 187 officers, two of whom no longer worked for the Capitol police on the day of the uprising. The 187 officers listed are far lower than the 276 acting officers of Capitol Hill Police Chief Yogananda Pittman, who told Congress they were active on Jan.6.
Additionally, the report points out that the Capitol Police leadership knew as early as July 2020 that the department needed to make significant changes, but inexplicably failed to do so.
The summary lists several examples, including a failure by the ministry to establish standard operating procedures for the Civilian Disruption Unit, highlighting a casual attitude towards the unit ultimately tasked with stopping the insurgency.
Expired ammunition and ineffective shields
Even equipment maintenance seemed to be a low priority. The summary shows that the CDU shields were not stored at the correct temperature making them ineffective, while some armory ammunition has expired.
In another example, the Inspector General wrote that a ministry official told investigators that investigators receive training every three years, as required by the manufacturer of an officer-carried weapon, but that the Ministry had no official direction directing them to conduct the training.
On the day of the insurgency, the CDU did not use all of its less lethal options, such as a 40mm grenade launcher, 37mm grenade launcher, and Sting Ball grenades because of “leadership orders”.
In the end, the unit “was operating at a reduced readiness level”, due to the numerous failures, the report said.
The summary describes a lack of standards for the critically important intelligence gathering and assessment arm of the Capitol Police and that the department did not follow the few procedures it had. For example, not all members of the intelligence division had top secret security clearance in their roles, “which could have caused the ministry to mismanage classified information,” and there was no training program for all employees of the division.
The summary says that in the fall of 2020, the intelligence branch of the Capitol Police was adjusted after it became clear that the unit “was not responding to requests from the department.”
As the department prepared for what it believed to be a January 6 rally, conflicting intelligence proved problematic, according to the report.
“The explanation provided by the OIG is astounding,” the summary reads. “The Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) says it is following protests which may include armed protesters and white supremacists, and the assessment 30 pages later is much more alarming, including that conditions on the ground could ‘lead to a dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public. CNN previously reported that the department’s intelligence division concluded that threats of violence were “ unlikely. ”
The summary lists 27 recommendations for remedial action, including changing procedures to “refine documentary reports that better capture operational impact to include unlikely outcomes based on intelligence, trend data, threats to members and l ‘information analysis’.
The USCP inspector general is expected to testify in Capitol Hill next week about the report and its findings.
This story has been updated with additional information from the summary report.